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SUMMARY
The Canadian government is now openly discussing the possibility of making 
cyberweapons part of its official national defence strategy. The new development 
was revealed in a recent government white paper, entitled “Strong, Secure, and 
Engaged” (SSE), which outlined defence policy across a wide range of activities. 
Specifically, the paper discusses working toward a “more assertive posture 
in the cyber domain by hardening our defences, and by conducting active 
cyber operations against potential adversaries in the context of government-
authorized military missions” with an explicit commitment to developing 
cyberattack capabilities. This direction not only opens up new possibilities for 
Canadian defence, it could also represent significant new risks. Without good 
answers to the difficult questions this new direction could raise, the country 
could be headed down a very precarious path.
Cyberweapons do offer unique benefits. Since they tend to be far less costly to 
deploy than kinetic weapons — such as missiles, bombs and guns — they can 
level the playing field between richer, stronger states and weaker, poorer ones. 
Larger states may even be at further disadvantage by relying on larger, more 
sophisticated computer systems that could become a liability if successfully 
1attacked. However, to date, countries have been reluctant to deploy cyberweapons in 
lieu of kinetic weapons. Furthermore, in those cases where cyberweapons appear to 
have been used by state actors, no state has accepted responsibility for using them. The 
Stuxnet virus used to cripple Iran’s nuclear research equipment is a prime example: Israel 
and the U.S. remain the primary suspects, but both deny involvement. 
Cyberweapons also possess risks of unintended consequences that can make the 
unintended consequences of kinetic weapons seem trivial. Notably, cyberweapons have 
a much greater potential to impact targets that were not intended by the attacker. For 
instance, when a virus-like computer weapon is unleashed on the Internet to exploit 
vulnerabilities in certain system software in a target country, there is a real possibility 
that the virus could also infect and damage computer systems inside the attacker’s own 
country that use the same software, or even infect the software of allies who use the 
software. It is also possible that the weapon could have unintended consequences within 
the target country, by infecting other systems that were never meant to be targeted and 
causing more collateral damage than expected. Launching a cyberweapon to disable an 
enemy’s supply-chain computer systems and accidentally infecting its nuclear systems, 
setting off a nuclear incident, is a terrifying scenario. It might even rise to the level of a 
war crime. It is worth noting, however, that there are no international treaties governing 
the use of cyberweapons. If Canada engages in cyberwarfare without one, there will be 
no formal limits on what actions are acceptable and what actions are not. 
Indeed there are many discussions that still must be had within Canada and beyond to 
mitigate the risk of pursuing cyberweapons. The mere act of announcing someday that 
we are developing cyberweaponry (which, to be clear, Canada has not done) will already 
carry risk, suddenly making Canada suspect in future unattributed attacks, and perhaps 
enticing other countries to disguise their attacks by routing them through Canada. It is 
unclear even whether a prime minister or Parliament will be qualified to safely declare 
cyberwarfare, given its technical complexity. These are just some of the debates we need 
to have before Canada decides to embark on developing cyberwarfare capabilities. Now 
is a good time for those debates to start.
2The Canadian government recently introduced a defence policy white paper entitled 
“Strong, Secure, and Engaged” (SSE) (Canada-SSE 2017) outlining Canada’s defence 
policy across a wide range of activities. The document uses the term “cyber” precisely 
86 times in its 113 pages — the vast majority of the references are to identify it as an 
area of importance and challenge — but the intended purpose appears to be defining 
this as an area of strategic importance. The definition of the “cyber domain” (Canada-
SSE 2017, 56) sets the issues in the wider context and very briefly describes how it fits 
within the military setting from a defensive posture. The white paper further discusses 
the threat to military assets and identifies other agencies such as the Communications 
Security Establishment, Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada and Shared 
Services Canada as partners in protecting Canadian cyber-infrastructure (Canada-SSE 
2017, 72). The document also proposes some steps that should be taken to enhance our 
cyber capabilities, such as using reservists with specialized skills (Canada-SSE 2017, 69) 
and enhancing our cryptographic expertise (Canada-SSE 2017, 41), but remains largely 
silent on mechanisms. There is little doubt that these recommendations are necessary 
and this call to increase capacity in these areas is a step forward given modern threats 
in cyberspace. 
One new factor in the SSE is the decision to assume a “more assertive posture in the 
cyber domain by hardening our defences, and by conducting active cyber operations 
against potential adversaries in the context of government-authorized military missions” 
(emphasis added) (Canada-SSE 2017, 15). Although these systems have likely been 
under development for many years within the Canadian military, the decision to 
openly develop active cyberattack capabilities and to openly signal that they could be 
potentially employed against adversaries is transformative.
This paper attempts to address questions around this transformative change by 
viewing them through a technological lens. Specifically, what are the intended 
and unintended consequences of a decision to publicly announce that Canada is 
condoning military-grade cyberweapons by developing them with the intention of 
using them against potential adversaries? This raises at least three separate questions 
that are addressed in this paper: (1) What are the consequences of deploying such 
weapons, for both the enemy and the state that deploys them? (2) What must be 
done to ensure that their use is in conformance with international law and the rules of 
engagement? (3) What are the consequences of condoning their development and by 
implication their deployment?
Unfortunately, we conclude the paper with a section entitled “Next Steps” because we 
do not have answers to all of these questions. Fortunately, the SSE document is a white 
paper and appears to be open for public discussion, so by taking some thoughtful next 
steps we may be able to avoid the most serious consequences of a decision to engage 
in cyberattacks. 
Beyond the core elements of this paper, several overarching questions include defining 
under what circumstances cyberattacks should be permitted and what should be done 
to ensure they cannot subsequently be used against us or will not lead to harming 
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with some demonstrable success but with some unintended consequences. What 
can we learn from the available information about the safe use of cyberattacks and 
when is it reasonable to use such weapons? The nature of this technology is different 
than other forms of military aggression used in either peace or war time. What checks 
and balances need to be put in place to ensure that it is used only under appropriate 
government-authorized oversight? What protections can be put in place to ensure that 
the inadvertent release of a cyberattack cannot occur?
The decision to endorse the development a cyberattack capability introduces a 
difficult dichotomy. Cyberattack technology exploits discovered weaknesses in digital 
systems. In a regime that only permits cyberdefence activities, the discovery of 
weaknesses and deploying a repair for the discovered weakness is a consistent choice. 
However, if Canada is to incorporate a cyberattack strategy, the decision to repair the 
weakness must now be traded-off against exploiting the weakness against an enemy. 
These undiscovered weaknesses are known as zero-day attacks because a previously 
unknown vulnerability in a computer system (hardware or software) is exploited “on 
the same day” the vulnerability becomes known to the wider world. 
This paper addresses several aspects of a decision to endorse cyberattacks in the 
SSE. Although this paper will consider the implications through a technical lens, it 
is not particularly technical, in that we consider what is possible rather than how 
it could be achieved. The scope that could be considered is exceptionally wide, so 
we begin by narrowing it to a more manageable one by defining the environment 
and terms (Section 1) and discuss/define the nature of cyberattacks (Section 2). We 
next consider the potential value of a cyberattack strategy in terms of the possible 
benefits and the utility in deploying these in a military context (Section 3), which is 
best considered as the intended consequences of such a strategy. The balance of the 
paper considers risks and consequences of a cyberattack-friendly policy both in terms 
of the technology itself and, to a lesser extent, the impact this will have on empowering 
adversaries to become more aggressive in their use of such weapons (Section 4), as 
well as other unintended consequences that may threaten our own infrastructure as 
a result of deploying such weapons (Section 5). We propose “next steps” that should 
be considered before, or in conjunction with, the decision to move forward with a 
cyberattack strategy such as that proposed in the SSE (Section 6). 
1. ENVIRONMENT/TERMS (DEFINITIONS)
Security, privacy, attack, defence, war and any other physical activity occurring in 
the real world have specific definitions and implications based on the context where 
the term is used. The same is true in a cyberworld, but when a term is used within a 
military context, it is necessary to provide specific contextual definitions. Unfortunately, 
the connotations from both the physical and virtual worlds are often overlaid on the 
military context, so it is critical to provide specific definitions to avoid imprecision. We 
4assume that the definitions for these terms and their potential subtle connotations in 
the physical world vis-à-vis their military uses are not problematic, but we will provide 
more specificity when required. 
The term cyberattack is used in several different ways in the literature. Most past work 
has focused on the protection of commercial and personal computers from what 
could be considered a high-tech form of crime using a computer. Thus, fraud, theft of 
data, theft of intellectual property, etc., using a computer or by attacking a computer 
is simply a modern version of criminal activity that has occurred throughout modern 
history. We do not consider “criminal” activity in this document except with respect to 
how it occurs in a military setting. 
There are at least two potential kinds of participants in cyber-military activities. 
The first potential actor would be nation states (or states). Nation-state warfare has 
traditionally been waged between clearly identifiable states (or groups within a state 
in the case of civil war). The financial cost of waging war is extremely expensive, so 
historically the ability to go to war has been limited to known states with defined 
boundaries (or at least with claims to defined boundaries). Although undoubtedly 
occurring throughout history, the recent move to increased activities from non-state 
actors and the rise of international terrorism have expanded the scope of traditional 
nation-state warfare. The virtual world expands upon this recent trend where the 
combatants are not universally recognized state actors. ISIL, al-Qaida, and others 
(Denning 2011) do not exist as traditional states but are capable of engaging in 
warlike activities and with similar goals to those of nation states. The virtual world has 
expanded these groups’ abilities significantly by allowing for fringe groups to engage 
in attacks on compute infrastructure. The potential for these virtual attacks becoming 
kinetic is an obvious consequence of the cyber aspects of these attacks. Although each 
group brings unique perspectives and challenges, the activities are similar and the 
potential consequences exist in both. However, as we will see, the non-state actors have 
much less at risk than traditional states if they engage in cyberattack activities because 
they have a relatively small set of assets that must be protected. 
Cyberwarfare can be broadly defined as cyber-related activities, either defensive or 
offensive, undertaken by state or non-state actors intended to disrupt or influence 
normal operations undertaken by those being attacked (Theohary and Rollins 2015). 
This would include activities by cybercriminals and others, including a myriad of players 
that must ultimately be considered collectively. However, this document necessarily 
narrows the scope to consider the potential use of cyberattack by state-based military 
organizations. We do not limit our discussion solely to traditional military branches 
such as army, navy, air force and marines but rather consider a state’s military activities 
more holistically, so espionage and military actions directed by a state intended to 
disrupt any target either military or civilian is within scope. Those who undertake these 
activities on behalf of a nation state are cyberwarriors, and these are distinct from 
other kinds of aggressive actors in cyberspace such as cyberterrorists, cyberthieves, 
cyberactivists (sometimes called hacktivists), or cybercriminals of various kinds 
(Theohary and Harrington 2015). Cyberspies may include non-state actors, such as in 
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undertaken on behalf of a state; but we could use the term cyberwarrior instead, given 
our more specific scope. 
The cyberweapons used are constantly evolving, which makes it difficult to define 
precisely what tools are used to wage a cyberwar. An abstract definition for “(c)yber 
warfare … refers to conflicts that utilize cyberweapons or electronic weapons either 
offensively or defensively, or both” (Dycus 2010). Dycus is defining cyberwarfare in 
terms of the use of a particular kind of weapon, but this raises the question of what 
happens if the weapons change. Unfortunately, this requires an attempt to provide an 
exhaustive set of currently available tools that could include various kinds of malware, 
botnets, distributed denial-of-service attacks (Theohary and Harrington 2015), and any 
one of several other possible known attacks. If new, not-yet-enumerated weapons are 
developed, they would be precluded from the definition, so any consequences from 
that tool would, by definition, not be cyberwarfare. Thus, a definition of cyberweapon 
should mirror the definition of cyberwarfare in that it is a cyber artifact used either 
defensively or offensively by state or non-state1 actors to disrupt or influence normal 
operations. The implications of this definition are that any defences used to protect 
state assets would be considered a part of the cyberarsenal, including firewalls, 
honeypots (Mairh et al. 2011), or any other tool associated with protecting critical cyber-
infrastructure from SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems (Krutz 
2006) to cloud services (Winkler 2011). 
A key requirement to defining cyber-activities is to not limit its scope to impacts that 
are only felt in a cyber environment.2 In short, we define cyber-activities as those that 
start and have an impact in the cyberworld and may impact on the physical world as 
well. A clear succinct definition that captures the essence of cyberattack is: “An act in 
cyber space that could reasonably be expected to cause harm” (Robinson, Jones, and 
Janicke 2015). Harm is defined beyond the virtual and includes any consequence that 
impacts on the object of the attack either directly or indirectly. A narrower definition 
that only considers the impact on computers or digital systems (software or hardware) 
is incomplete and does not truly reflect the potential for harms. However, a distinction 
is drawn between harms that only occur within a virtual world as distinct from those 
that also impact the physical world. These secondary consequences or harms are 
referred to here as kinetic. For example, an attack that only disables a computer system 
used for data analytics is not kinetic, although it may cause real harm; while an attack 
on the digital control systems of a nuclear plant that causes damage to the power 
generators is kinetic because it leads directly to physical harm. 
1 
Recall that we are not considering non-state attackers but they are included here to be consistent with 
the earlier definition of cyberwarfare and these actors would ultimately have to be considered in any 
holistic strategy.
2 
“There is a difference between using information technology or cyber space as a domain to fight and 
fighting in the domain of cyber space.” (Liles et al. 2012)
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unique mode of attack and the need to assess the intent behind the use of the weapon 
itself. As indicated above, cyberweapons can be deployed in two distinct ways. First, 
an attack can be direct with the goal of having an immediate effect. The hope is that 
the attacked infrastructure will be vulnerable when the weapon is deployed and the 
damage caused will be maximized, or at least most effective on its initial deployment. 
Alternatively, a cyberweapon can be planted into a victim’s cyber-infrastructure with 
the hope of activating it at a later date when it will have the maximum effect. Kinetic 
weapons may also have both deployment modes in some limited circumstances, but 
planting a “bomb” stealthily is at best challenging, while embedding a latent piece of 
code within a large code-base is relatively simple and difficult to detect.
The definitions here are sufficient for our purposes but they would likely be debated by 
other commentators. With this caveat in mind, we now use this framework to consider 
the nature of cyberattacks and how they fit within the larger issue of cyberwarfare. 
2. NATURE OF CYBERATTACKS
Truly kinetic weapons have a very specific life cycle in that they typically take many 
years to develop and a non-trivial amount of time to produce. During this time, 
thoughtful reflection can occur about their applicability and use, so by the time they 
become a viable weapon, the rules of engagement for their use has been carefully 
considered. Obviously, this cycle is shortened and the amount of thoughtful reflection 
undertaken during an active war is much less, but there is always a gap between a 
kinetic weapon’s inception and its deployment in a theatre. The decision to deploy the 
weapon is also often carefully considered and the consequences of its use beyond 
its immediately apparent target can be evaluated both before and during its ongoing 
deployment. Finally, the consequences of using the weapon is almost always immediate 
and, once activated, those consequences are generally complete within a very short 
time frame. This life cycle also includes a careful consideration for how excess or 
unused weapons should be dismantled and disposed of in a safe way. Thus, a new 
missile will take years to design, develop and produce; it will remain a viable weapon 
for a protracted period and, when it is used, the consequences of its use will be fully 
executed almost immediately; finally, the decision to take it out of active use can 
occur immediately and a careful dismantling process can be undertaken to allow the 
remaining weapons to be safely disposed. Consequential issues, such as unexploded 
ordnance (e.g., landmines), are a part of the dismantling process, and although this may 
continue to have impact into the future, the scope remains limited and mitigation plans 
can significantly reduce this unintended consequence. 
In contrast, the life cycle of a cyberweapon does not always include any of the long-
term timeliness inherent in strictly kinetic weapons. The development of a cyberattack 
can occur in an exceptionally shortened period. Once developed, the cost and time 
required to replicate it or to “produce” it is negligible. The weapon is immediately 
viable but does require a strategy that allows it to be deployed. However, it is unclear 
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weapons into an active combat situation. The challenge in the virtual world is to find 
a suitable vulnerability at which to deploy the cyberattack, but once a weakness 
is identified, this can occur from any connected point on the web. Modern kinetic 
weapons can also be deployed through drones, but these still require the weapon be 
placed and deployed relatively close to its target. Cyberweapons can also be deployed 
well in advance of their use. Once developed, an attacker can wait for an opportunity 
at any time to place the cyberweapon into the opponent’s cyber-infrastructure. Once 
placed, it can lay dormant until either an explicit command is issued from the attacker 
or when a set of conditions occurs that will signal the cyberweapon itself to activate. 
The latter case is analogous to placing bombs in an ally’s command centre in case 
that state might become an enemy in the future. This would enable you to take out 
their command-and-control structure before the conflict even really begins. The 
effectiveness of the developed weapon can also be tailored or modified to allow for 
dynamic environments. Unlike a directly kinetic weapon that is essentially immutable 
after it has been produced, cyberweapons are often intrinsically modifiable. This allows 
them to be enhanced even after they are deployed and even modified while they are 
being deployed in the same way modern software is “upgraded” once installed on 
your computer system — although, in the case of a cyberweapon, permission from the 
owner would not be sought. A cyberweapon can also be altered to work on its target 
even if the underlying computer hardware is changed. Back-end compilers allow the 
attack functionality to be created independently of the actual hardware that it runs 
on. (Although some cyberweapons exploit vulnerabilities in specific hardware, many 
exploit software that is developed independently of its hardware platform.) 
3. INTENDED CONSEQUENCES — POTENTIAL BENEFITS
Cyberweapons are developed for various reasons and each has an intended purpose. 
However, in all cases, the goals of these weapons can generally be defined based 
on the motivation of the developer and the potential benefits that might accrue as 
a result of their deployment. In the following, a number of potential benefits to the 
cyberattacker are considered, but there are undoubtedly many other hoped-for results. 
We continue to consider this from a nation-state perspective, but several of these 
motivations are also important to non-state actors.
1. Levels the field: Weaker states are less capable of launching kinetic attacks 
due to expense and logistics, but a cyberattack, although potentially costly to 
develop, is relatively inexpensive to deploy. Thus, a poorer state (or a non-state 
actor) can effectively engage in attacks on much larger more powerful and 
capable states. 
2. Turns a strength into a weakness: Extremely powerful states typically have 
a large cyber-infrastructure supporting both their military and civilian 
organizations. By attacking these large-scale and diverse cyber-systems, 
a cyberattacker may be able to change a powerful state’s apparent cyber-
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number of computing devices used so the likelihood of failures increases in 
proportion. Although the redundancy in larger systems affords some protection 
to ensure the key infrastructure remains available, a cyberattack exploiting 
specific vulnerabilities could lead to system-wide failure, thereby eliminating the 
anticipated benefits of redundancy to ensure availability.
3. Disrupt militaristic capacity-building activities: By engaging in cyberattack 
through various modalities, it is possible to disrupt or disable a potential enemy’s 
ability to launch direct attacks (cyber or kinetic) in the future (Iasiello 2015). The 
2010 Stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges is likely the best-known example, but 
other similar malware, more akin to cyberespionage, include Duqu, Flame, and 
Gauss (Bencsath et al. 2012).
4. Disrupt response capabilities at point of attack: Russia’s military invasion 
of Georgia in 2008 occurred in conjunction (or at least concurrently) with 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on digital systems in the target 
country’s public and private sectors, similar to cyberattacks against Estonia 
in the previous year. The goal of these attacks was to acquire control of the 
“information space” so the attacker could set the agenda and establish its voice 
as the only one providing information to those affected.3
5. Cyberweapon use during military actions: The potential benefit of 
cyberweapons in actual military conflict is currently only theoretical because it 
appears all governments are reluctant to choose or exploit this option if physical 
warfare is either underway or anticipated. Kaplan’s work on the “secret” history 
of the U.S. military’s use of cyberweapons provides several insights into the 
challenges of using cyberattack during direct military actions (Kaplan 2016), 
and also details the halting way the U.S. military and the wider U.S. government 
came to realize the potential of cyberattacks. Although there has been an 
increased interest in undertaking and using cyberactivities during non-war 
times, there appears to be a hesitation to exploit cyberactivities when things 
become kinetic. The military appears to prefer direct physical military actions to 
subtle and potentially (or at least perceived to be) less-effective cyberweapons. 
For example, in the 2011 Libya conflict, the U.S. considered using cyberattack 
to break down firewalls with the goal of disrupting military communications. 
However, U.S. commanders chose instead to use air strikes with conventional 
weapons to disable these installations kinetically. The U.S. is not alone in 
its reluctance to use cyberweapons when a kinetic option is available. For 
example, during the 2014 Ukraine-Russia crisis, Russia chose to use armed men 
3 
Russia uses the term “information space” to describe what we are essentially calling “cyberspace” in 
this document. The distinction is primarily that “information space” emphasizes the desired goal of 
controlling “the sphere of activity connected with the formation, creation, conversion, transfer, use, and 
storage of information and which has an effect on individual and social consciousness, the information 
infrastructure and the information itself” (Giles and II 2013). In any modern sense of the word, this is 
enabled, facilitated and implemented with what we are calling cyberspace and is built upon a cyber-
infrastructure.
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internet communications. Given that the Russians had installed these systems 
and given their substantial knowledge of cyber-systems generally, it seems that 
an equally viable option would have been to use some form of cyberweapon 
to disable these communication channels without the need for direct physical 
military action. 
In summary, the publicly documented examples of the use of cyberattack are all 
proven only by forensic analysis of the weapons themselves. Credible claims of state 
authorship for these weapons are rare if they exist at all. The major states, with the 
clear capability and/or interest to develop and exploit these weapons, all denied that 
they were involved once the weapon had been deployed. The U.S. and Israel publicly 
disavow any responsibility for Stuxnet; the Russian and Chinese provide similar denials 
whenever forensics indicate that they were involved in the development or deployment 
of cyberweapons; and even the North Koreans — generally considered to be the 
authors of the “wiper malware” aimed initially at South Korea’s cyber-infrastructure — 
deny they were involved in any way. However, it is also clear from the above that the 
primary benefit for the cyberattacker is not necessarily directly supportive of physical 
war. In fact, no example could be found in the public record that indicates that a 
cyberattack was preferred to direct physical military operations. Thus, cyberweapons, 
with a willingness to undertake cyberattack, appear to be considered primarily to (1) 
level the playing field between countries, (2) attack countries that are more reliant on 
their cyber-infrastructure during non-war times, (3) disrupt an enemy’s ability to build 
military infrastructure, or (4) to use it solely at the initial point of attack. 
The potential benefits from the intended consequences appear to be sufficiently 
significant that pursuing a cyberattack strategy is potentially worthwhile. However, If 
we are reluctant or completely avoid the use of these cyberweapons during military 
activities, it is important to ask why are we really developing them? It appears that we 
are only using these, to date, to disrupt or monitor groups/states with whom we are 
not currently at war. Thus, to put our current activities in the most positive light, they 
are being developed for espionage or to undertake covert pre-war activities that would 
likely be considered a violation of international law if they became known or were being 
done in the physical world. The key question would change from “are we developing 
cyberweapons for military advantage?” to asking “are we developing these weapons 
for use in peace time or to undertake secret ‘wars’?” If the latter is the case, then is the 
endorsement of cyberattack really an endorsement of non-sanctioned warlike activity 
on the part of those who have little public oversight? And, if so, is it even possible to 
provide appropriate checks and balances to ensure these activities do not lead us 
into unnecessary wars or cause us to lose important allies because we are using them 
against the very people we consider friends? With this in mind, we turn to potential 
risks and consequences.
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4.  RISKS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE SSE’S CYBERATTACK-
FRIENDLY POLICY
Before considering the cyberattack aspect of the SSE defence-policy white paper, it is 
helpful to set it within its wider context. SSE includes a longstanding and fundamental 
tenet that calls for the protection of “critical military networks and equipment 
from cyberattack by establishing a new Cyber Mission Assurance Program that will 
incorporate cybersecurity requirements into the procurement process” (Canada-SSE 
2017, 73). The novelty in this statement is the explicit statement that cyber-related 
procurement should explicitly consider the threats from cyberattack, a requirement 
that is either long overdue or a codification of best practices aimed at defending 
our military’s cyber-infrastructure, which may be going on already. However, this 
only explicitly speaks to new procurement, while the need to develop protection for 
existing cyber-assets should also produce an immediate call to action to assess all 
assets. Unfortunately, the document appears silent on the protection of legacy systems 
currently in place and the potential threat to them for a number of reasons. 
Risks to current assets:
• Potential attack surfaces are already in place in the form of flaws in existing 
software and hardware assets currently deployed. Many of these systems are 
well beyond their anticipated lifetime and remain critical parts of our military’s 
capacity. Cyberattacks on these systems should be carefully assessed and 
appropriate changes made either to the existing asset, or better, by replacing 
it with a current, state-of-the-art version. 
• Maintenance of these legacy systems will likely require software alterations 
that may open new attack surfaces either embedded in the alterations 
themselves or because of unanticipated interactions between the original 
software and the update. Legacy heterogeneous systems are notoriously 
difficult to protect from unanticipated attacks because they may be vulnerable 
due to: the legacy software/hardware, the updates made to modernize the 
systems, or from the interaction of the old systems with the new ones. 
• As legacy hardware becomes more difficult to procure or there emerges a 
desire to increase the functionality of deployed military assets, novel risks 
from the new technology will open up additional attack surfaces. For example, 
an IoT (“internet of things”) device with enhanced communication ability will 
bring significant advantages to an asset, but may do so at the risk of making 
other, older elements in the asset vulnerable to cyberattacks that it would 
otherwise not be exposed to.
Thus, a critical risk raised in the SSE, but not addressed adequately by it, is the 
protection of currently deployed assets and how the impact of new technology that will 
be required to maintain its functionality can best be protected from cyberattack. 
The real novelty in the SSE’s policy goes further than the clearly mandatory need for 
cyberdefence on existing and new assets by explicitly calling for the development of 
“active cyber capabilities and (their) employ(ment) … against potential adversaries in 
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support of government-authorized military missions” (Canada-SSE 2017, 73). It is well 
known that some states have been developing cyberattack capabilities for many years 
and there is also clear evidence that these attacks have been deployed in the past. 
However, the decision to do so as a part of an endorsed strategy of a state is significant. 
The issue of a state developing cyberattack capabilities and determining how or 
when to deploy them is multifaceted. The geopolitical lens is a critical one because it 
effectively, at least implicitly, justifies other states’ efforts to develop such capabilities 
and acknowledges cyberattack as a legitimate form of warfare. On one hand, this 
is a potentially positive step because it brings cyberwarfare under the set of rules 
governing warfare in general, which implies that deploying a cyberattack would have 
to be framed as “war.” This would discourage the use of cyberattack in the same 
way that physical attacks on another state must be consider in light of their potential 
consequences as it enters a war-footing. Recall that the use of these weapons currently 
appears to be done without the same implications of an equivalent physical attack on a 
state, but at the same time states are quick to deny any involvement in such activities. 
By engaging in legal warfare, states subscribe to certain kinds of behaviour, including 
not explicitly attacking non-combatants or committing war crimes, such as genocide. 
If cyberweapons were to be defined as weapons of war, then their use would at least 
implicitly force them to be used only under the rules of war. 
Conversely, acknowledging this as a valid form of warfare and subjecting it to the “rules 
of war” implies that such a set of rules exists and have been generally accepted. This is 
not the current case and many states claim to either not participate in any cyberattack 
activities, except cyber-defensive ones, or are silent on the issue, so it is unlikely that 
a set of rules will be developed in the immediate future. Thus, before developing 
cyberattack as a weapon of war, the rules for its deployment should be carefully 
articulated and agreed to internationally. Furthermore, the implication of their use vis-
à-vis an “act of war” should be defined and agreed to internationally.4
If this could be achieved, the question of enforceability of these rules would have to 
be addressed. The developer of current cyberweapons can often only be determined 
with complex forensics that are not yet perfected. Currently, the development of these 
weapons is likely undertaken by the same group that initially deploys them, but this will 
likely not be the case in the near future. Just as there are physical “arms developers” in 
the physical world, it would be much easier to create a cottage industry that develops 
cyberweapons and sells them to any purchaser willing to pay the price. Thus, the 
current methods used to identify the source of an attack by examining the fingerprints 
of the software itself will no longer work or will be unhelpful in identifying the group 
that actually deploys the weapon. 
Enforcement will require that the group deploying the weapon be identified to either 
ensure justice is attained following inappropriate use or to confirm the group is in 
fact the one who delivered the weapon so subsequent military responses can be 
4 
The challenges of accomplishing this a priori are discussed in Section 6.
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legitimately undertaken. Cyberattacks, by their very nature, are often delivered from 
multiple sources and are deployed through complex and difficult-to-trace virtual 
modalities. A combination of network hops around the world and a co-ordinated 
cyberattack launch could be authorized in one part of the world but appear to come 
from anywhere in the world. Tracing the source of the attack may be impossible to 
verify with complete certainty, which might make it impossible to hold the real culprit 
to account. Current state-of-the-art forensics may be able to identify the author of 
malware, but it is exceedingly difficult to identify the precise deployment source. Thus, 
the technology necessary to definitively identify cyberweapon deployments does not 
exist and modern cyber-infrastructure does not provide sufficient traceability primitives 
to identify the source of cyberweapon use with sufficient certainty. In fact, this actually 
“encourages” the use of these weapons because their deployer would be difficult to 
detect. However, there is a substantial risk of other states launching cyberattacks by 
routing them through Canada to make it appear as if the attacks had originated from 
here. Thus, before adopting a cyberattack-capacity-building strategy such as the 
one proposed in the SSE, Canada should develop sufficient checks and balances on 
the use of cyberweapons to ensure that an attack by another state using Canadian 
infrastructure can be plausibly denied. This might require difficult changes to the 
current internet infrastructure or sufficient transparent overhead on the valid use of 
cyberweapons that are seen as very compelling to the rest of the world. 
Although there are likely many other risks, the final issue raised here is related to 
the appropriate management of the development of cyberweapons. Unlike physical 
weapons, cyberweapons typically exploit an unknown vulnerability in existing hardware 
and software. Thus, the weapon developer must find the vulnerability, develop an 
exploit to take advantage of it, and identify an enemy to use the weapon against. Each 
of these three stages present unique weapon-management challenges that we consider 
next.
1. Identifying these vulnerabilities is a timely process and often involves a fair 
amount of luck, so they are more likely to be discovered with multiple people 
working on them. Once discovered, they must be kept secret or patches can 
be developed to disable the vulnerability (and as a result, the weapon itself) 
reasonably quickly. The ethics of not warning others about these vulnerabilities 
is beyond this document’s scope, but at the very least it can lead to significant 
unintended consequences as discussed in Section 5. This means that the 
weapon’s usefulness is limited by the vulnerability’s life cycle; to be useful, the 
weapon must be deployed while the vulnerability is still unprotected. This might 
provide an inappropriate incentive to use the weapon too quickly and could 
even skew battlefield plans in unanticipated ways.
2. The challenge of developing an exploit to take advantage of an identified 
vulnerability may be fairly straightforward in some cases but it could also 
involve a significant amount of expertise and innovation to accomplish. This 
is clearly not something that can be readily “outsourced” to other states, and 
even if it was to be done by verified cyberweapon suppliers, the challenges of 
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managing this process should not be underestimated. If the approach is building 
capacity within military (or quasi-military) national centres, it will likely require 
a substantial investment in public dollars that would be difficult to justify given 
the clandestine nature of the activities and the possibility (ideally) that these 
cyberweapons would never be meaningfully deployed. 
3. The final challenge of identifying an enemy to use the weapon against and 
to determine precisely when and how it should be used, given the two points 
above, is unclear. The hesitance to use cyberweapons at times of military 
conflict in preference to kinetic weapons suggests that they are unlikely 
to be the preferred choice once a military conflict has started. Using them 
beforehand is fraught with risk because their use, if they could be traced back 
to the originator, could lead to a war that might otherwise have been prevented. 
In the case of a large, powerful state using these weapons, this will likely be 
avoided because the weaker state is unable to respond in a meaningful way. 
Assuming that the U.S. was the originator and user of Stuxnet in the Iranian 
nuclear facilities, the fact that Iran did not respond in an overtly military way is 
likely because it could not. Thus, the most likely use of cyberweapons would 
be in some form of cyberespionage either passively (spying) or aggressively 
(disrupting another state’s activities) with plausible deniability.
Overriding each of these potential risks is the need to have oversight on the 
development, use, and deployment of cyberweapons. Military activities can only be 
undertaken with the direct oversight of the prime minister, but they would likely involve 
a wider discussion for political reasons. Given the nature of these weapons and how 
they would need to be developed, this oversight would likely have to be done in a 
more secretive way. The ultimate deployment of cyberweapons might occur with the 
oversight of Parliament, but would those considering this have sufficient understanding 
of the implications and risks associated with cyberweapons, which could have many 
unintended consequences? This is the topic to which we turn next. If a more selective 
group were identified, how would the public be assured that this group was acting with 
sufficient oversight to ensure their activities did not lead to serious consequences that 
would not be endorsed by Parliament or the public at large?
5. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The unintended consequences arising from a cyberattack can be grouped into two 
categories: unintended consequences impacting on those being attacked; and ones 
impacting those undertaking the attack (or their allies). 
Unintended consequences potentially impacting an enemy: Once weapons are 
deployed, the scope of their effect is difficult to anticipate. Ideally an attack would be 
highly targeted and very specific to a particular computer system or to the real-world 
resource it controls. There are unique identifiers in most hardware that would allow a 
cyberweapon to only impact a particular machine. However, the attacker would have 
to identify that machine in advance of developing and deploying the weapon, and the 
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cyberweapon would become useless if the victim simply changed or upgraded their 
hardware. Thus, there are very few incentives for a cyberattacker to produce a weapon 
with such a narrow target and it is unlikely that such a narrowly focused cyberweapon 
would be effectively deployed except in very limited circumstances (e.g., the Stuxnet 
attack on the Iranian nuclear systems).
Most cyberweapons have a virus-like nature to them where they seek to infect as many 
systems as possible to maximize their impact. This alone would make it difficult to 
control the unintended consequences that might occur on an enemy. However, even 
if the cyberweapon does not contain a virus-like nature where it seeks all computer 
systems that have the vulnerability that allows it to perform its cyberattack, it is 
still extremely difficult to limit its effect to only the intended target. The unintended 
consequences on the enemy might be much wider than what has traditionally been 
considered acceptable in terms of collateral damage. For example, a cyberweapon 
aimed at disabling an enemy’s supply-chain computer systems but which also infects 
the enemy’s nuclear-weapons systems, causing them to deploy in situ, is unlikely to be 
considered a reasonable level of collateral damage and might even rise to the level of 
a war crime. Although these appear to be very different systems and are likely run on 
entirely different computer systems, the underlying operating systems and applications 
that enable them to function are often shared.5 
Furthermore, best practices in the computer industry demand that systems are 
updated in a timely and regular way to ensure that the systems are current across 
an organization’s entire scope.6 Organizations (the military being no exception) 
seek to minimize high software/hardware maintenance costs by exploiting as much 
homogeneity as possible in their deployed systems because this simplifies and 
streamlines the updating process so is often a requirement in the procurement 
decision. However, this homogeneity also means that a cyberweapon meant to exploit 
a vulnerability found in one system can also attack other systems in the organization 
that have the same vulnerability. In short, a state’s desire to minimize costs drives it 
toward homogenous solutions across its many sectors and this can be exploited by 
cyberweapons unintentionally. This widens the impact (a potential benefit from the 
attackers viewpoint), but also opens the possibility that the more narrow intended focus 
impacts other systems that were never intended to be touched. Thus, these unintended 
consequences are a likely occurrence given current efficient approaches to upgrading 
computer systems in most modern organizations, and they may be unavoidable. 
5 
This is less likely to be an issue for larger states with substantial capacity, because specific proprietary 
software and systems can be developed in-house. However, this is not universally true, as many states 
do not have sufficient capacity to develop their own unique operating systems for each aspect of their 
critical infrastructure. In fact, the cyberweapons most likely to be developed will rely on these states 
using a known suite of commercially available products. 
6 
It is unclear if the major military players in the world use a more tailored approach to system upgrades, 
but even if a few of the most advanced militaries do, it is a safe bet that most of them do this with 
efficiency rather than security in mind.
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Unintended consequences potentially impacting the attacker: The nature of 
a cyberattack also introduces another potential threat. A kinetic weapon, once 
deployed, will either strike its target or be destroyed on its way. The same is true of 
cyberweapons, but this is where the analogy ends. A cyberweapon is generally victim-
agnostic, so it is just as threatening to the attacker’s cyber-systems as it is to the 
victim’s. The question of how to deploy a cyberattack that cannot subsequently impact 
on your own systems is an open one. To consider how this might be addressed we 
consider a number of options:
1. Explicitly identify which machines will allow the cyberattack to be performed. 
The challenge is the same as described above when we considered limiting the 
scope of damage to an explicit subset of machines. It is extremely difficult to 
identify the victim’s machine and to ensure that changes in hardware do not 
disable the efficacy of the attack. This “white list” approach, which specifies 
where a cyberattack is allowed to occur, is not feasible in a cyberwar scenario. 
The alternative is a “black list” that states where the cyberattack is not allowed 
to execute. This will only work if a complete list of all of the attacker’s assets 
could be produced and could then be deployed with the cyberweapon to 
limit its functionality. Creating such a list might be possible, but it would 
be exceptionally long, and it would have to be constantly updated as new 
computers were purchased. Even if this were possible, the required access to the 
deployed cyberweapons would likely raise flags within the victim’s IT group that 
would lead to its detection. 
2. Protecting the attackers from their own weapons. This essentially requires an 
update to the attacker’s vulnerability to the cyberweapon. This can be done in 
two ways:
a) Use the appropriate vendor’s update mechanism: The mechanism is likely 
to be the only truly universal way to update all of the potentially vulnerable 
systems within a state’s critical infrastructure. However, the solution is, by 
definition, universal, so it would be nearly impossible to convince a vendor to 
selectively update specific systems to a particular vulnerability. In fact, this 
would likely lead to a very expensive lawsuit for the vendor if it knowingly 
left vulnerabilities in software that it sold to its customers, so there would be 
virtually no incentive for a vendor to do so. 
b) Secretly update all of the attackers’ own systems’ vulnerabilities: Since 
the attacker knows the vulnerability, developing a patch would likely be 
possible, if not straightforward, even if it required some reverse engineering 
of proprietary software. Assuming, for the moment, that this is possible, 
the question of how to distribute the patch to only a single organization 
in a confidential way is critical. If such a patch was to become known, any 
potential victims would likely immediately seek to determine how to protect 
their own systems. Even if they were not aware that a cyberweapon had 
been deployed on their system, the desire to patch their systems would 
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be extremely high and, once accomplished, it would disable the attacker’s 
cyberweapon. Pragmatically, in a sufficiently complex organization, such 
as a large modern military (let alone all of its allies cyber-systems) with 
an uncountable number of suppliers, it would be effectively impossible to 
selectively update all potentially impacted systems with a vulnerability patch. 
Furthermore, many military suppliers provide goods and services to more 
than one country, which would increase the likelihood that potential victims 
might inadvertently receive the very patch necessary to protect themselves 
from such an attack. 
c) Protecting the attacking state’s non-military infrastructure: The 
cyberweapons are exploiting vulnerabilities that also exist in “everyone’s” 
systems. All public and private organizations and their infrastructures have 
an important stake in the use of any cyberweapons. No state will want to 
deploy a cyberattack that quickly comes back and shuts down key national 
institutions, such as banking systems, financial markets, transportation 
and power systems, non-military communication systems, etc. Earlier, we 
touched briefly on the issue of the ethics of withholding knowledge about 
software/system vulnerabilities, but at this point it becomes a strategic issue 
as well as an ethical one. If a state has knowledge about a vulnerability but 
fails to notify its own organizations about the risk, and if we readily assume 
enemies are looking for these vulnerabilities as well, then we face two risks: 
attacks from our enemies, when we have a known solution; and attacks from 
ourselves when these weapons are deployed but come back to attack our 
own organizations. 
Finally, consider the challenge of dismantling a cyberweapon. Several issues must  
be considered:
1. If a cyberweapon has been deployed but a decision is made to withdraw it, a 
key question is: Can these deployment sites be accessed again? It is unlikely 
that a cyberattacker would be willing to notify the victim about the latent 
weapons buried within its system, so the only way to remove it is to once again 
get access to it. One potential solution would be to send the victim a “friendly 
patch” that the attacker strongly encourages them to apply, but this will likely 
raise suspicion, at best, and could lead to the need to deploy the cyberweapon 
anyway because of a newly poisoned relationship! In short, once deployed, it 
would be difficult if not impossible to remove. 
2. Most of these weapons have an ability to migrate either explicitly as a virus 
and/or physically by copying them across multiple devices (e.g., using an 
infected USB stick). Thus, even if we know where they were initially deployed, 
the question of how to ensure that the cyberweapon has not migrated to other 
machines without the attacker’s knowledge is critical. Although it might be 
possible to leave a digital trail within the cyberweapon itself, so a forensic expert 
could attempt to follow its path, this would open the possibility that the trail 
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would be discovered by the potential victim, which would lead to the weapon’s 
discovery and it being disabled while still in its active or operational phase.
3. Given that this software can travel through an enemy’s system in difficult-to-
track ways, the next concern is: What if this vulnerability shows up on an ally’s 
systems? Several interesting question will likely be asked at this point, but 
the first one will be: Was it inadvertently migrated from within the attacker’s 
system through normal operations, or is this an attack by the enemy on the 
ally’s systems? If the cyberweapon was discovered by the enemy and the 
vulnerability was known to exist in one of the attacker’s ally’s systems, there is 
nothing to stop the victim from patching its own systems and using the weapon 
itself. Furthermore, if this is discovered by the ally and reported to the attacker, 
how can this be disabled without revealing the danger to which the attacker 
has exposed the ally? It is likely, especially if this is a cyberweapon used for 
espionage, that the ally will become suspicious about whether this was placed 
on its systems accidentally by the attacker, intentionally by the attacker, or 
intentionally by the victim using it itself. Clearly different kinds of responses 
would be called for depending on each case. 
6. NEXT STEPS
Drawing conclusions at this point would be premature. This paper has attempted to 
raise certain issues based primarily on what cyberwarfare technology is capable of at 
this point in time. We have raised many issues in the paper about the consequences 
(both intended and unintended) of developing cyberweapons and it is clear that 
there are more questions than answers surrounding many of them. To move forward 
at this point to implement or even formally endorse a strategy of cyberattack would 
be risky and premature. There are challenging technical controls that must be put in 
place as well as a critical international discussions on how cyberweaponry fits within 
the rules of war. Countries appear to be moving forward with cyberattack strategies 
but subsequently deny any such participation. This approach has the potential for 
serious consequences, and the need for better oversight (from non-military sectors) 
is critical to a safe coherent strategy for any nation. Furthermore, the management of 
deployed cyberweapons and their subsequent removal has not yet been addressed 
from either a technical or social-engineering perspective. The many technological 
issues identified above should be sufficient to cause at least a pause in the current 
SSE proposal to endorse cyberattack and the debate must become broader than the 
viewpoint of military proponents. It should be opened to the public for thoughtful 
fulsome discussions that include various technical, political, legal, and geopolitical/
regulatory perspectives.
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We now turn to identifying what Canada’s next steps should be to fully explore and 
consider the many questions developed above. Although there are likely many different 
directions open, the following seem to be the most key and self-evident initial steps. 
1. Canada must define the goals of a cyberattack strategy
a) Who are potential opponents that could be subject to an attack?
b) What are acceptable reasons to use cyberweapons?
c) How do we define successful attacks and distinguish them from failed 
attempts?
2. Rules of engagement must be clearly defined
a) When should cyberweapons be allowed to be used?
b) When should they be used: before, after or in conjunction with direct kinetic 
military actions?
c) Should their use be reported upon openly and honestly to the Canadian 
public?
3. Who has the authority to use cyberweapons either in peace or wartime?
a) Who should be allowed to authorize their use?
b) Once authorized, who should be allowed to deploy them and under what 
circumstances?
c) Who has oversight after their use in terms of assessing their effectiveness, 
their appropriateness, and evaluating any unintended consequences or 
collateral damage. 
4. Rules of war need to be defined for cyberweapons.  
Canada must work with other nation states to formally codify the rules under 
which states can engage in cyberattack and cyberespionage. These might 
mirror existing kinetic-warfare rules, but they will require articulation through a 
technological lens. These issues need to be developed because it is unclear if 
Ongstad’s claim is in fact true that “… cyberattacks alone are unlikely to cause 
an escalation towards kinetic or conventional warfare” (Ongstad). Garrie argues 
that “(c)yber-warfare occurs when one country perpetrates a cyberattack 
against another country that would to the reasonable person constitute a state 
act of war” (Garrie 2012). If we do not have clear rules about the use of these 
cyberweapons as a nation state, then we run the risk of stumbling into a kinetic 
war! Thus, a critical next step is undertaking the difficult task of coming to 
international agreements about the use of these weapons, their production, and 
their implications. Although this may be considered by some to be naïve and 
currently unachievable, why should it not be required for cyberweapons as it 
is for every other weapon? Historically, new weapons are developed, deployed 
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and the consequences measured retrospectively. This is precisely why we have 
prohibitions against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons but only after 
observing their severe consequences during wartime. Do we need to wait until 
society suffers these consequences again before putting in place rules about 
their use?
5. Partnership with cybersecurity stakeholders.  
The issues of cybersecurity are much broader than their application to cyber-
military either for offensive or defensive purposes. The question of whether 
a partnership could be forged between the military and public/private 
cybersecurity organizations is a valid one to consider. As a representative 
example, the government of Canada established the “Canadian Centre for 
Cyber Security” (CCCS) in 2018 to inform, protect, develop and share, and 
defend cyberdefence technologies where the mandate is to engage in cyber-
related security issues in both the private and public sectors. Although there 
is substantial overlap with the military use of cyberweapons and the defence 
against potential attacks, it is important to make a distinction between the two. 
Covert cyberespionage or cyberattacks could seriously impact on the systems 
that the CCCS was established to address, but the mandate for the centre is to 
protect existing cyber-infrastructure, which contradicts the largely clandestine 
uses proposed in cyberwarfare. An obvious approach would be that the military 
works in partnership with the CCCS so that, if an attack were to be initiated, the 
CCCS could quickly disseminate the necessary patch to protect allies’ cyber-
systems. Unfortunately, this would directly contradict the CCCS’s primary 
mandate of protecting Canadian cyber-infrastructure and expose the CCCS to 
serious, legitimate criticism.  
 
Imagine a very plausible scenario: The CCCS is asked to withhold a patch of a 
known vulnerability by the military to allow its use as a cyberweapon. While 
waiting for this opportunity, the vulnerability is exploited to attack Canadian 
systems. This would undoubtedly lead to significant criticism because an agency, 
specifically funded to protect Canada, has acted as an arm of the military and 
exposed the country’s systems to cyberattack. Thus, the mandate of the CCCS 
directly contradicts the SSE’s goal of developing cyberattack capabilities, so it 
hard to envision a partnership that would ultimately be mutually beneficial. If this 
kind of partnership is not viable, then how can the military meaningfully engage 
with non-military stakeholders to ensure the utility of any weaponry produced 
and the safety to Canada and its allies?
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SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS: THE DEPTH AND PREVALENCE OF POVERTY
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Social-Policy-Trends-Poverty-Depth-and-Prevalence-March-2019-USE.pdf
Ronald Kneebone | March 2019
UPDATING AN ODA POLICY IN CANADA: THE ROLE OF GLOBAL REMITTANCES IN DEVELOPMENT
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ODA-Policy-Bansak-Simpson.pdf
Nicole Simpson and Cynthia Bansak | March 2019
PROVINCIAL PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING AND FINANCING IN ALBERTA: SEARCHING FOR A BETTER COURSE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Searching-for-a-Better-Course-McMillan.pdf
Melville McMillan | March 2019
TRADE POLICY TRENDS: CHINESE PROTECTIONISM: RESTRICTION ON CANOLA IMPORTS FROM CANADA
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Trade-Policy-Trends-Canola-Imports-Beaulieu-Klemen.pdf
Eugene Beaulieu and Dylan Klemen | March 2019
UNBLOCKING THE BOTTLENECKS AND MAKING THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN TRANSPARENT: HOW BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY CAN UPDATE GLOBAL TRADE
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Global-Supply-Chain-Norberg-final.pdf
Hanna C. Norberg | March 2019
WHICH POLICY ISSUES MATTER IN CANADIAN MUNICIPALITIES? A SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL POLITICIANS
https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Canadian-Municipalities-Lucas-Smith.pdf
Jack Lucas and Alison Smith | March 2019
